China's foreign policy today
consists of two things: 1) Taiwan and 2) securing reliable energy
sources to feed its insatiable growth. The prospect that China would use
its nuclear and missile weapons technology as a bargaining chip in its
efforts to promote trade has always been a frightening prospect for the
U.S. This is particularly true in gaining access to oil and gas. The
official statement following China's October 1964 nuclear weapons test
declared that the superpower "nuclear monopoly" had been
broken.
Fears immediately arose that
nuclear weapons would stimulate aggressive and irresponsible actions by
China. Then other countries in the region, such as Japan and India,
would respond by developing their own nuclear weapons capability. India
and Pakistan soon joined the nuclear club.
Evidence mounted that China was
providing nuclear weapons material and technology to other countries
including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. U.S. expectations regarding
prospects for responsible Chinese behavior or the U.S.'s ability to
influence China's proliferation behavior were minimal. Indeed, fears
about the consequences of a Chinese nuclear weapons capability had led
the U.S. government to develop secret contingency plans for a possible
military strike against Chinese nuclear weapons facilities.
In the early and mid-1990s, U.S.
diplomacy re-emphasized the importance of China joining and adhering to
the obligations in international nonproliferation treaties and accepting
the standards of multilateral export control arrangements. U.S.
nonproliferation efforts focused mainly on blocking Chinese efforts to
export ballistic missiles and nuclear reactors to countries in the
Middle East and South Asia.
By the mid-1990s, China had
stopped transfers of complete missile systems and major sales of
un-safeguarded nuclear materials and technology but continued to export
a wide range of dual-use equipment and technology that could contribute
to WMD and ballistic missile development programs. The September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States and the U.S. war on terrorism
raised the profile of WMD proliferation in Washington's security policy
and provided an opportunity for Beijing to improve relations with the
United States.
China has supported the new U.S.
emphasis on international cooperation against terrorism and has sought
to make cooperation on nonproliferation issues a positive aspect of
bilateral relations. China has also indicated a desire to be viewed as a
responsible member of the international community regarding
nonproliferation.
A critical problem is the Chinese
government's inability to implement effective export controls to
prohibit proliferation. The U.S. continues to see problems in the
proliferation behavior of certain Chinese controlled entities and
remains deeply concerned about the Chinese government's often narrow
interpretation of nonproliferation commitments and lack of enforcement
of nonproliferation regulations.
The government of China has not
done enough to ensure that all Chinese entities abide by the
nonproliferation commitments the Chinese government has made. Secretary
Powell said recently, "China's fulfillments of its nonproliferation
commitments are crucial to determining the quality of the U.S.-China
relationship."
The Chinese Government states, at
the highest levels, that it opposes the proliferation of missile
technology and that it forbids Chinese firms and entities from engaging
in transfers that violate its commitments to the United States.
Unfortunately, the reality does not bear this out.
Take, for example, the China North
Industries Corporation, known as NORINCO. For some time, the U.S. has
alerted the Chinese Government of its concerns about the activities of
NORINCO. Nonetheless, the Chinese Government has taken no action to halt
NORINCO's proliferant behavior. In the face of Chinese inaction,
therefore, the Bush Administration sanctioned NORINCO twice last year.
The serial proliferator problem,
however, isn't limited to just NORINCO. Another example of a serial
proliferator that has not been reined in by China is CPMIEC. The United
States sanctioned CPMIEC or its parent organization in 1991, 1993, 2002
and 2003, for missile-related transfers to Iran and Pakistan.
There is an energy lifeline that
extends from ports in the Middle East, Mediterranean and Black Sea to
the maritime crossroads in the South China Sea. Security of this
lifeline is vital to China and to the rest of Asia. In 2003 China
consumed 5.4 million barrels of oil per day, eclipsing Japan as the
world's number two largest consumer behind the U.S.
Analysts predict China's oil
consumption will double by 2010 and quadruple by 2020 matching the U.S.
Security experts fear China's determination to minimize dependence on
oil from the Middle East will tempt Beijing into oil-for-arms alliances
with states that sponsor terrorism. Coal now counts for 70% of China’s
total energy needs making China the world's major carbon-emissions
polluter.
The alternative to the seaborne
energy lifeline is a land borne energy lifeline from Siberia. China and
Japan are locked in a competitive battle to see who wins Moscow's
agreement to build either a 2,300 mile pipeline from Siberia to coastal
Japan or a 1,400 mile pipeline from Siberia to Diaquing in China. Huge
stakes ride on the petrorivelry. The oil war is the latest reminder that
a global economy is dependent on a single fuel.
Energy security means far more
than hardening refineries against terrorist attacks. At the most basic
level energy security is now providing the global economy enough fuels
and electricity at affordable prices that every nation can keep its
economy running. A failure of energy security means industrialization
and modernity will grind to a halt.
Every day 30,000 new cars merge
onto roads in Beijing, slowly bringing the city to its knees. Newspaper
headlines in China are rife with energy shortages, blackouts and
brownouts. China and the U.S. could soon find themselves in a head-to
head competition for fuel. Signs of future confrontation are evidenced
by China and Japan's scrapping over Siberia and American companies
battling for oil stakes in Kazakhstan.
The U.S. is building a network of
bases whose main goal is to protect access to oilfields in volatile
places like Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. In the run up to the Iraqi war
the U.S. clashed with France, Germany, China and Russia over who would
have access to Iraqi oil. The Chinese have offered the Saudis a foothold
in China's largest energy market along with sophisticated weaponry.
Escalating rivalry with other big
energy consumers will spark an endless list of conflicts as China fights
to feed its growth engine. With Taiwan and oil dominating China's
foreign policy, it's reasonable to expect oil-for-arms and proliferation
will remain a major threat to U.S. security.
Copyright by S. Owen Smith. All Rights Reserved.
