With the fall of the Soviet Union
in1989 and the end of the Cold War, there was a dramatic reduction in
U.S. concern over nuclear stability and security. The American public
demanded a post-Cold War dividend and the Navy was forced to cut its
Pacific force structure by half. That was the signal for China to start
a massive military modernization program to fill the vacuum and claim
sovereignty over the South China Sea -- including Taiwan, the Spratly
and Paracel Islands, the Mekong River Basin, Japan's Senkaku Islands and
Okinawa.
China has been in constant
conflict with her neighbors, relying on a 2000-year-old historic
perspective to exert her claims. At the same time China began buying
Russian weapons and stealing American technology. In 1997,
Representative Christopher Cox revealed a Chinese blueprint for China's
covert and overt efforts to steal, buy or otherwise acquire sensitive
military technology. Clinton's destruction of export controls was given
as the main reason which had been a reward to the pro-China business
that had contributed to Clinton's campaign funds.
China changed its aviation
doctrine from defensive to offensive, using long-range Flanker attack
aircraft purchased from Russia. China then claimed sovereignty over the
world's most vital sea and air corridors provoking an international
incident by ramming an EP-3E Aries surveillance aircraft.
The EP-3E incident was one of
many, in a long line of Chinese attempts to elbow the U.S. out of the
Far East. When China refers to "territorial waters" that is
diplomatic code for a long-standing claim that China has sovereignty
over the South China Sea.
A Pentagon study was initiated to
determine the relationship with China that best served U.S. interests.
The study examined China's possible responses to Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) and how nuclear weapons policy would be affected. One
result from the study argued that nuclear weapons were relevant in a
Taiwan confrontation because all three parties were determined to cast a
nuclear shadow on the outcome.
In a very short period of time
after the Bush administration took office China was singled out as the
principal security risk. China had to come to grips with U.S. policy
changes that abrogated the ABM Treaty, an ultimatum that the U.S.
"would defend Taiwan without question", U.S. resolve to
produce a viable BMD and making preemptive strike an instrument of
policy.
China is committed to an arms
build-up that is directed at forcefully unifying Taiwan with the
Mainland. In the 2006 timeframe there will be 600 short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. If Taiwan were absorbed
by China, the major waterways in East Asia would be under Chinese
control -- this is an absolutely unacceptable prospect for the
U.S., Japan and nations such as South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore,
Australia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
A continuous series of missile
tests are under way from Aegis ships to prove the feasibility of the
Upper-Tier portion of the Navy's Sea Shield to shoot down ballistic
missiles. But an Upper-Tier defense capable of confronting hundreds of
ballistic missiles in a clash with China will not be in place until
sometime after 2013 -- after a clash with China over Taiwan is likely to
occur. Many components of the Upper-Tier defense are in limbo due to
cutbacks that followed the end of the Cold War.
The Space Based Infrared Satellite
Program (SPIRS) is the principal casualty. In addition, no provision has
been made for a missile ship capable of carrying enough interceptor
missiles to free up the Aegis ships to fend off attacks by massive
swarms of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles. To confront a swarm of
600 ballistic missiles would require a ship capable of carrying
approximately 2500 interceptors (assuming a boost phase interceptor
capable of firing on a depressed trajectory and a terminal phase
interceptor configured similar to the SM-3 interceptor currently being
used in mid-course tests.). The only ship big enough to handle this task
would be a converted Essex-class hull.
Other shortcomings exist in the
ability of the Navy Sea Shield to defend in the littoral against swarms
of Chinese Sunburn-type cruise missiles, quiet diesel submarines and
cheap wake and pattern following torpedoes. Accelerated funding for the
EA-F18G "Growler" suppression aircraft incorporating an agile
(AESA) radar and a "new" anti-ship torpedo is also required to
fend off swarms of Flanker fighters and small surface combatants armed
with torpedoes and cruise missiles.
These weapons must be integrated
with the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) which gives the Aegis
equipped ships its network-centric picture of the battlespace. No near
term defense is in the works against the 30+ Russian Molniya-class boats
China is procuring from Russia. These upgraded versions of Tarantul-class
fast attack Corvettes carry four Mach 3 Sunburn cruise missiles
(SS-N-22). An anti-ship defense system like Raytheon's SeaRAM needs
10-20 seconds to locate, identify, target, track and trigger its
point-defense system against this kind of threat. But how effective will
this defense be against swarms that suddenly appear out of hiding in the
littoral?
The U.S.-China relationship
relative to nuclear deterrence is difficult to understand because it has
evolved almost opposite to U.S.-Russian relations. In the U.S.-Russian
relation, the two countries agreed to move away from a strategic
relationship based on nuclear deterrence. China's goal, on the other
hand, is to develop a nuclear second-strike capability that assures U.S.
mutual destruction.
America's response to September
11th has been to implement BMD, which is a deterrent not only to
rogue-states and terrorists but to China’s ballistic missiles. As
first among equals, America offers to pursue BMD cooperatively with
other major powers. It does this to enhance mutual security. China
charges that BMD is provocative because it reinforces Taiwan's drift
toward independence. But since the U.S. is committed to defend Taiwan,
the U.S. requires a layered BMD to deny China the opportunity to counter
the U.S. by punishing American combat forces, threatening American bases
in the region and threatening the American homeland.
China's hardliners contend that
America pursues a strategy of encirclement, containment and humiliation
of China. Specifically, they point to an encirclement of China by Japan,
Korea, Taiwan and Australia in consort with the U.S. The American
point-of-view attributes China's hysteria to its totalitarian power
structure. The strategic nuclear policy that best serves U.S. interests
continues to be the one that has existed for decades -- a one-sided
dominance by the U.S. of any level of nuclear escalation in any
potential conflict.
China's nuclear modernization
program was a pre-September 11th effort to address its fears and
shortcomings about the effectiveness of its nuclear force (e.g.,
vulnerability of its silo-based force to preemption, limited ability to
penetrate missile defenses, etc.). In considering China's modernization
plan, the U.S. has to assume China will deploy its second-generation
upgraded, solid-fueled mobile ICBMs that can be hidden in containers or
underground safe from any preemptive U.S. attack.
These containerized mobile
missiles could be shipped by China's container fleets to Chinese port
locations near the U.S. East coast, Hawaii, Okinawa and Japan. The U.S.
must also assume that China will MIRV their warheads (use Multiple
Independent Reentry Vehicles). This requires significant investments to
upgrade China's antiquated second-strike force.
China's unofficial policy toward
the U.S. in the long-term is to drive America out of Asia and out of the
South China Sea, which contains many of the world's most important trade
routes. This strategy is commonly referred to as sea denial. China
rattled its saber during half of the last century making territorial
claims against most of the countries in its neighborhood.
China has gone to war with
Vietnam, India and the U.S. War with the U.S. was an ill-conceived
conspiracy with North Korea to throw the U.S. out of South Korea, which
backfired leading to the Korean War. A year earlier, Mao had proclaimed
the People's Republic of China, and the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to
the Taiwan Straits to "contain" Red China from attacking
Taiwan.
In the interim the U.S. has been
called upon numerous times to confront China over Taiwan's security. The
U.S. presents an important barrier to Chinese expansion in the South
China Sea. The U.S. advocates and exemplifies the kind of democracy many
Chinese admire and want to emulate. The main objective of the Chinese
Communist Party is to retain power and it therefore cannot tolerate any
kind of political democracy.
There are Chinese and American
proponents on both sides of the arms and proliferation debates that
would like not to have to spend their countries resources on this
escalation of arms but until proliferation control.
